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Abstract 
 
The impact of presidential coattails on the legislative party system is a highly 
intuitive idea. The coattails effect is believed to depend on the number of 
presidential candidates and the size of the presidential prize. This article 
proposes a different way of understanding this relationship. We argue that 
the strategic behavior of political parties and the way in which the number of 
presidential contenders shapes the legislative party system can only be 
predicted for an intermediate range of presidential power. Outside this range 
the effect is indeterminate. We test our proposition on democracies with 
direct presidential elections from 1945-2011. Our results confirm that the 
number of presidential candidates is an important determinant of the 
legislative party system and show that whether or not legislative elections are 
held close to presidential elections has little influence on party-system 
fragmentation in countries with directly elected presidents. 
  
Introduction 
 
There is a vast literature on the determinants of legislative party systems. At 
the most general level, there is basic agreement that institutional and social 
factors interact to generate party system structures. To this end, scholars 
typically focus on the effects of specific electoral systems and the impact of 
social heterogeneity (Cox 1997; Lijphart 1994; Mozaffar et al 2003). However, 
scholars have increasingly integrated other factors into the study of legislative 
party systems. Specifically, there is an ongoing debate about the effect of 
direct presidential elections. Here, there is support for the proposition that 
presidential coattails help to shape the legislative party system (Amorim Neto 
and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003; Golder 2006; Samuels and Shugart 2010; 
Shugart 1995; Hicken and Stoll 2013; Stoll 2013). The idea that the relative 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections is a determinant of the 
electoral competition is highly intuitive. However, recent work has stressed 
how the effect of presidential coattails is contingent upon other factors. 
Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Golder (2006) have emphasized the 
interaction between the proximity of elections and the effective number of 
presidential candidates at the previous presidential election. In turn, Hicken 
and Stoll (2013) have stressed the importance of presidential power as a 
further interaction term. 
In this article, we think differently about these factors. We argue that 
presidential power is likely to shape the effective number of presidential 
candidates in a way that will have a reductive effect on the legislative party 
system, but only within an intermediary range of presidential power. This is 
because political parties only have an incentive to coordinate their electoral 
behavior at presidential elections within such a range. On either side, there 
are incentives both for parties to stand candidates and for them not to do so, 
ensuring that the positive relationship between the effective number of 
presidential candidates and the legislative party system will not be observed. 
Also, in contrast to recent scholarship we argue that this proposition should 
be tested solely on the population of countries with direct presidential 
elections. We are skeptical that the language of natural experimentation can 
be employed to justify the inclusion of parliamentary republics and 
monarchies in any test of the effect of direct presidential elections on the 
legislative party system. When we test our proposition on a selection of 
democracies with direct presidential elections in the period 1945-2011 
inclusive we find good support for it. Overall, our findings suggest that the 
effect of presidential coattails is less important that has typically been 
suggested, that we need to investigate more the determinants of the effective 
number of candidates at presidential elections, and also that we need to think 
carefully about how we capture variation in presidential power when trying 
to estimate its effect. 
 
Theory 
 
The opportunity for presidential coattails to shape the outcome of legislative 
election occurs in countries where the president is directly elected on a 
separate ballot from the legislature. In these cases, the competition for the 
control of the executive branch of government does not pass exclusively 
through the legislature. This means that in contrast to pure parliamentary 
systems where political parties need to appeal to only a single pool of voters, 
parties have to compete at two separate elections. This generates the potential 
for what Samuels and Shugart (2010: ch. 5) call “an electoral separation of 
purpose”. Here, there is the potential for parties to adopt different office-
seeking and/or policy-seeking strategies at the two elections in order to 
maximize their chances of winning control of both the executive and 
legislative branches of government. When political parties adopt different 
strategies, we can say that they have undergone a process of 
presidentialization.	   According to Samuels and Shugart (ibid.: 127), 
presidential coattails are an indicator that political parties are presidentialized 
and have adapted their organization and behavior to the incentives generated 
by the separation of powers. Thus, we are likely to observe presidential 
coattail effects only in countries with direct presidential elections and when 
parties have become presidentialized as a result of the separation of powers 
system. 
 Even though presidential coattail effects will occur only in countries 
with a directly elected president, the electoral separation of purpose can vary. 
A low separation of purpose occurs when the presidential and legislative 
electorates of parties overlap. When this happens, similar to parliamentary 
systems presidents neither hurt nor improve their parties’ fortunes in 
legislative elections. A high separation of purpose occurs when the electorate 
for the presidential candidate is substantially different from that of candidates 
in the legislative race. In these circumstances, the performance of the party’s 
presidential candidate may not necessarily improve the party’s performance 
in the legislative election. For example, while President Lula won 49 per cent 
of the votes in the 2006 presidential elections in Brazil, his party won only 15 
per cent of the votes in the legislative election that was held on the same day 
(ibid.: 139). Therefore, the proximity of presidential and legislative elections in 
countries with a directly elected president does not always generate 
presidential coattails and does not fully account for the impact of presidential 
elections on the legislative party system. To identify the circumstances under 
which presidential elections influence the legislative party system through a 
coattail effect, several factors have been considered. 
The proximity of the presidential election to the legislative election is 
often considered to shape the legislative party system (Shugart 1995). There is 
now considerable evidence that if the presidential election is held proximately 
to the legislative election, then there will be a reductive effect on legislative 
party system (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al 2003; Golder 2006). 
Working on the assumption that the presidency is the most important 
institution in the system, the presidential election becomes the focus of 
electoral competition. In this context, legislative elections approach second-
order elections, especially when they are held immediately after the system-
defining presidential election. The primacy of presidential over legislative 
elections ensures that presidential elections have substantial coattails effects, 
shaping the legislative party system in its image. We can see an example of 
this effect at work in France. In 2000 a constitutional amendment ensured that 
reduced the length of the president’s term to five years, the same as for the 
legislature. At the same time, legislative elections were scheduled a few 
weeks after the presidential election. The result is that however close the 
result of the presidential election, there is a strong incentive for voters at the 
honeymoon legislative election to confirm the result of the presidential 
election, returning a majority for the newly elected president. We can clearly 
observe this effect following both the 2002, 2007, and 2012 presidential 
elections. Extrapolating on the basis of this logic, when the temporal gap 
between presidential and legislative elections grows, the shadow of the 
presidential election weakens. Thus, the coattails effect declines as the gap 
between the two elections increases. 
 Another factor is the number of candidates at the presidential election. 
There are good grounds to believe that the effective number of candidates 
who compete at the presidential election shapes the effect of the proximity of 
presidential and legislative elections on the legislative party system. Cox 
(1997: 212) argues: “[t]he nature of the coattail opportunities that face 
legislative candidates should be similar, the nature of the advertising 
economies of scale that might be exploited should be similar, and so forth”. 
Thus, if there is a small number of candidates at the presidential election, this 
can reinforce the reductive effects of proximity on the legislative party 
system. By contrast, if the number of presidential candidates is high, then the 
reductive effects of proximity may be counteracted. Indeed, a high number of 
presidential candidates may have an inflationary effect on the legislative 
party system. Golder (2006) has tested and found support for this hypothesis. 
Specifically, he finds that presidential elections “stop having a statistically 
significant reductive effect on the number of electoral parties once there are 
more than about 2.8 effective presidential candidates” (ibid.: 40). 
 Recently, Hicken and Stoll (2013) have added further to this debate. 
They emphasize that the size of the presidential prize varies from one country 
to another. The direct election of the president does not imply that the 
president is the central political actor in the system. There are countries with 
directly elected but very weak presidents. Ireland is a case in point. There are 
similar countries with relatively strong presidents, such as France, and yet 
others with very powerful presidents indeed, for example Chile. In this event, 
there is no necessary reason to believe that presidential elections will always 
have primacy over legislative elections. As a result, the effect of proximity 
and the number of candidates at the presidential election will depend on what 
Hicken and Stoll (ibid.: 295) call the “horizontal centralization” of policy-
making authority. This means that a weak presidency may counteract the 
reductive effect of very proximate presidential and legislative elections on the 
legislative party system even when there are few candidates at the 
presidential election.	  That said, the variation in presidential power alone does 
not explain why presidential elections have no coattail effects in countries like 
Ireland, where the president is institutionally very weak, and in Brazil, where 
the president is institutionally very strong. While the electoral base of 
presidential and parliamentary candidates may vary significantly between 
countries with ceremonial presidencies and countries where the presidential 
office is the most important political prize, the coattails generated by 
candidates at each end of the continuum of presidential powers may be 
equally low. 
To sum up the existing debate, we have good theoretical reasons to 
believe that the legislative party system will be shaped by the presence of 
directly elected presidents. In this context, the existing literature tells us that, 
all else equal, we need to consider interactions between the relative proximity 
of presidential and legislative elections, the effective number of presidential 
candidates at the presidential election prior to the legislative election, and the 
power of the presidency. Golder (2006) prioritizes the interaction between the 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections and the effective number of 
candidates at the presidential election. Hicken and Stoll (2013) prioritize the 
interaction between the proximity of presidential and legislative elections, the 
effective number of candidates at the presidential election, and the power of 
the presidency. 
We aim to make two contributions to this debate. The first concerns the 
context to which it should be applied. To date, the theoretical insights of this 
literature have all been tested on data sets that pool countries with directly 
elected presidents and those without, including both parliamentary republics 
and parliamentary monarchies. For example, in Golder’s article parliamentary 
systems constitute 60.7 per cent of the 603 observations in his whole sample 
(2006: 39). In Hicken and Stoll’s study, parliamentary systems comprise 60.8 
per cent of the 590 observations in their pooled model. Indeed, monarchies 
alone make up 41.5 per cent of their total observations (2013: 304-305). 
However, the inclusion of parliamentary systems is somewhat puzzling, 
because the theory relates solely to the effects of direct presidential elections 
on legislative elections. What is the theoretical justification for including 
parliamentary systems in the study? Surprisingly, only Hicken and Stoll 
(2013) provide such a justification. They state: “the ultimate counterfactual to 
a presidential election being held concurrently with a legislative election is no 
presidential election at all. In other words, at the most basic level, the 
experimental "treatment" is the existence of a presidential election” (ibid: 300). 
They go on to say: “we compare the legislative party systems of the treatment 
group (legislative elections in regimes with a popularly elected president) to 
the legislative party systems of the control group (legislative elections in 
regimes without a popularly elected president)” (ibid.). Stoll (2013) reiterates 
this logic. 
The language of natural experimentation is alluring. Even so, we can 
question whether these studies meet basic experimental conditions. In 
particular, we can question whether the assignment of the treatment is ‘as if’ 
random (Dunning 2008). For example, there may be ‘demonstration effects’ 
such that countries choose systems that are close to their neighbors. The 
adoption of presidentialism across Latin America is a case in point. Similarly 
many countries in the former Soviet Union chose semi-presidential systems 
within a very short space of time in the early 1990s. In addition, even if the 
treatment was assigned ‘as if’ randomly, are the treatment and control groups 
comparable (Sekhon and Titiunik 2012)? The same subjects are not observed 
before and after the application of a particular treatment or placebo. Instead, 
the differences within and between the subjects in the two groups are merely 
controlled for in the multivariate regression. This is an entirely appropriate 
way to test the theory, but it is not a natural experiment. Finally, when we 
conduct a natural experiment, we include a control group to provide us with 
variation in the explanatory variable. However, when we examine the effects 
of proximity, the effective number of presidential candidates, and presidential 
power on legislative party systems, we do not need the variation that comes 
with a control group. There is already variation within the set of countries 
with directly elected presidents. To put it another way, the experimental 
"treatment" is not the existence of a presidential election, it is the presence or 
absence of proximate presidential and legislative elections, a higher or lower 
number of effective presidential candidates, and stronger or weaker 
presidents. We should still be able to observe the effects of these variables 
solely within the population under consideration without the need for a 
parliamentary “control group”. 
In sum, we question whether parliamentary systems should be 
included in a test of a theory about the effects of direct presidential elections. 
We are skeptical as to whether their inclusion can be justified as an example 
of a natural experiment. Moreover, even if they are included, we would still 
expect the results to be robust to their exclusion. If they are not, then this 
would suggest that any positive findings are being driven by their inclusion 
in the dataset, rather than by the substantive effect on the population to which 
the hypothesized effect applies. 
Secondly, we think about the nature of the interaction between 
presidential power and the effective number of presidential candidates 
differently. We follow Cox (1997) above in thinking that there is a positive 
relationship between the effective number of presidential candidates and the 
legislative party system. However, we have good theoretical reasons to expect 
that presidential power will affect the number of candidates at the 
presidential election. Hicken and Stoll (2008) have already proposed such a 
relationship. They hypothesize that when the presidency is very weak, parties 
have little incentive to stand candidates. So, the number of candidates should 
be small. However, when presidential power increases somewhat, then 
parties have more of an incentive to stand, but they have little incentive to 
coordinate their presidential candidates, meaning that number of candidates 
contesting the presidential election should be relatively high. However, when 
presidential power increases further still, the incentive for strategic 
coordination is present, meaning that the number of candidates should 
decline. Thus, they expect a bell-shaped curve. They find some evidence to 
support this theory, though as presidential power increases they find that the 
reductive effect disappears. In fact, they find that when presidents are very 
powerful, there is a puzzling increase in the number of candidates once again. 
So, rather than a bell-shaped curve, they find a sideways, elongated S shape 
(ibid.: 1120). At this high level of presidential power, though, the relationship 
with the number of presidential candidates is not statistically significant. 
We agree with Hicken and Stoll that there is likely to be a relationship 
between presidential power and the number of presidential candidates that 
will shape the legislative party system, but we think about the logic 
differently. We agree that when there is a very weak presidency, there may be 
little incentive for parties to stand a candidate at the presidential election. It 
may be more efficient to save the costs of campaigning for the legislative 
election. At the same time, though, when there is a very weak presidency the 
political costs of losing the presidential election are also very small. Moreover, 
non-partisan candidates may have a greater incentive to stand. If the 
presidential election is seen as a second-order election, then partisan voting 
may be weak and non-partisan candidates may stand a greater chance of 
winning votes. Therefore, even when there is a very weak presidency, we 
may observe a large number of presidential candidates. Thus, a very weak 
presidency may be associated both with a small number of presidential 
candidates and a large number. Ireland is a case in point. Here, the president 
is very weak and since 1937 six presidential elections have been uncontested. 
This suggests that the presidency is a prize that is scarcely worth winning and 
parties do not always see an incentive to contest it. Even so, in 2011 there 
were seven candidates with an effective number of 3.75. In addition to party 
nominees, there were also non-partisan candidates, one of whom came 
second at the election. So, the same country has experienced both very low 
and relatively high numbers of presidential candidates as a function of the 
calculations made by partisan and non-partisan actors. We expect an 
equivalent dual logic when the presidency is very powerful. In this case, the 
prize may be so big that parties have little incentive to engage in strategic 
coordination. The costs of not standing and, therefore, not winning the 
presidency may be so great that there is an incentive for parties to stand. So, 
Shugart and Carey (1992: 201) point out that if the stakes are sufficiently high, 
then the certainty of losing the presidency by not contesting it may be much 
worse than the probability of losing it to another opponent. This logic is 
similar to the one that Hicken and Stoll (2008: 1121) suggest to explain their 
puzzling finding. At the same time, though, if the prize is so great, then losing 
may also be very costly. As they suggest elsewhere but in relation to 
candidates at legislative elections (Hicken and Stoll 2013: 296), when the 
presidency is so powerful it is important to be on the winning side. Therefore, 
there may be an incentive not to stand a presidential candidate, but to wait 
and support the candidate that emerges victorious from the contest. Thus, a 
strong presidency may be associated both with a small number of presidential 
candidates and a large number. For example, in Panama there were three 
candidates at the 2009 presidential election with an effective number of only 
1.99. By contrast, in 1994 there were seven candidates with an effective 
number of 5.56. If the logic about weak and strong presidents is correct, we 
would only expect to observe a significant reductive effect of presidential 
power on the number of presidential candidates in an intermediary range 
when the incentive for strategic coordination is strong. We can think of this 
effect in terms of the electoral separation of purpose. In this intermediary 
range, presidents and assemblies need to cooperate with each other in order 
to govern effectively and avoid political deadlock. Voters understand that 
presidents need the support of the assembly in order to pass the national 
policies on which they campaigned. Therefore, they have an incentive to 
support the president’s party at the legislative election too. Smaller parties 
may also see an incentive to be part of the presidential coalition rather than 
presenting their own candidates.	  For these parties, the strongest incentive to 
take sides occurs when the race between two serious presidential contenders 
is so close that by running their own candidates minor parties might risk 
tipping the balance in favor of their less preferred option (Shugart and Carey 
1992: 255). In sum, while we expect a positive relationship between the 
effective number of presidential candidates and the legislative party system, 
we expect presidential power to shape competition at the presidential election 
in a way that means we are only like to observe a reductive effect of 
presidential power on the legislative party system at an intermediary range of 
presidential power. 
Finally, we are agnostic about the independent effect of proximity. 
There is a basic intuition from Shugart (1995) that proximate presidential and 
legislative elections are likely to reduce the effective number of legislative 
parties, but we have seen that more recent work has stressed the contingent 
effect of this variable. Golder (2006) argues that the key interaction is between 
the proximity of presidential and legislative elections and the effective 
number of presidential candidates, while Hicken and Stoll (2013) argue that 
the key interaction is between the proximity of presidential and legislative 
elections, the effective number of presidential candidates and presidential 
power. We wish to include an estimation of the effect of proximity to test for 
whether or not there is evidence of presidential coattails, but, given this recent 
work has reduced expectations about the independent effect of proximity, we 
do not necessarily expect it to find support for such an effect. 
Overall, we differ from both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) 
in that we expect the key interaction to be between presidential power and 
the effective number of presidential candidates, whereas they privilege 
proximity as a constituent element of their preferred interactions. In addition, 
whereas both Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013) expect support for 
their preferred interactions when countries with direct presidential elections 
are pooled with countries with parliamentary systems, we have no such 
expectations about our preferred interaction. We expect to find support for it 
when the population is limited to countries with directly elected presidents. 
What is more, we argue that even if there is evidence to support both Golder 
(2006) and Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) expectations when all countries are 
pooled, we would expect their findings still to be robust to the exclusion of 
parliamentary systems, otherwise a theory about the effect of direct elections 
would have little direct relevance to the population to which it is meant to 
apply. 
 
Variable descriptions 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the relative fragmentation of the party 
system at legislative elections. Consistent with Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), 
Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013), we capture this variable by coding 
the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). The main source of the data 
for this variable is Bormann and Golder’s (2013) dataset recording democratic 
electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. We take the figures for their 
enep variable. For missing observations, we complement these data with 
figures from Michael Gallagher’s personal website 
(http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/D
octs/effno.php – accessed 28 June 2013). There is a very strong correlation 
(0.99) between his ENEP figures and those recorded by Bormann and Golder. 
However, Gallagher records ENEP for a slightly different set of countries, 
allowing us to include a small number of extra observations. 
 We have three explanatory variables of interest. The first measures 
presidential power (PRESPOW). This variable is notoriously difficult to 
capture. There are many different measures of presidential power and the 
reliability of some of these measures can be questioned (Fortin 2013). 
Moreover, the correlation between different measures can be relatively low. 
For example, Tavits (2009: 48) reports that the correlation between two indices 
– Siaroff (2003) and Metcalf (2000) is only 0.41. Unsurprisingly, she finds that 
her results vary as a function of the measure that she uses. Here, we aim to 
reduce the likelihood that the results of our study are sensitive to the choice of 
an individual measure by pooling ten separate measures of presidential 
power (Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo 2009; Armingeon and Carreja 2004; 
Cranenburgh 2008; Elgie and Moestup 2008; Johannsen 2003; Moestrup 2011; 
Frye 2002; Hicken and Still 2008; Shugart and Carey 1992; and Siaroff 2003). 
For each measure, we recorded the presidential power score for each of the 
countries in our data set. We then normalized the country scores for each 
measure on the basis of the following formula - (country score minus 
minimum possible value)/(maximum possible value minus minimum 
possible value). We then recorded the mean of all the normalized scores for 
each country. For example, six of the ten measures recorded a score for 
Romania. Shugart and Carey (1992) gave Romania a score of 4 on a scale of 0-
40, or a normalized score of 0.1. By contrast, Siaroff (2003) recorded a score of 
5 on his scale from 0-9, or a normalized score of 0.56. When the six scores for 
Romania were normalized, the mean normalized score was 0.31. In some 
cases, we recorded more than one score for a given country. This is because 
the ten measures of presidential power record new presidential power scores 
when a country passes a constitutional amendment that affects the president’s 
power. So, presidential power can vary within a given country over time. The 
mean normalized scores lie in a range from 0 for a very weak president to 1 
for a very powerful president. (The scores are reported in Table 1.) Overall, 
this method gives us exceptional cross-country coverage. It also allows 
idiosyncratic scores for individual countries from particular measures to wash 
out when they are pooled with the scores for the same country from other 
measures. Finally, while the correlations between individual measures can be 
low, the correlations between the scores derived from this method and those 
derived from a similar pooled method but different individual measures 
would most likely be higher because even if one whole measure was 
idiosyncratic its effect would be diluted when pooled with a set of other 
measures. Therefore, we can be as confident as possible that the results of the 
model are not sensitive to our measure of presidential power. 
 The second explanatory variable is the effective number of presidential 
candidates (ENPC). This variable records the ENPC figure for the presidential 
election that was held immediately prior to the legislative election if the 
elections are not concurrent or at the concurrent presidential election if they 
are. We take the values of ENPC from the data set described in Bormann and 
Golder (2013) and their enpres variable. This means that in the event of an 
uncontested presidential election, such as the ones in Ireland, we record an 
ENPC value of 1. Consistent with the practice adopted by Golder (2006) and 
Hicken and Stoll (2013), we record an ENPC value of 0 in countries without a 
directly elected president. 
 The third explanatory variable is measure of the proximity between 
presidential and legislative elections (PROXIMITY). Again, we follow 
standard practice and follow the basic methodology adopted by Amorim 
Neto and Cox (1997), Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013). The 
PROXIMITY measure ranges from a value of 0 when a legislative election is 
held at the exact mid-point between two presidential elections and 1 when the 
legislative election is held concurrently with the presidential election. The 
only change we make is that we calculate the value as a function of the days 
between the two types of elections. By contrast, Golder (2006) and Hicken and 
Stoll (2013) calculate the value as a function of the years between the two 
types of elections. This means that we have a broader range of values for our 
proximity variable than Golder and Hicken and Stoll. We are confident that 
this amendment does not substantively change the results because Stoll (2013) 
has shown that Golder’s results are remarkably robust whether years or days 
are used as the units to calculate the proximity index. Consistent with the 
existing literature, the PROXIMITY value for countries with a parliamentary 
system is always recorded as a value of 0. 
 We have three control variables. These are the same as the ones 
included in the models by Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll (2013). The first 
(MAGNITUDE) captures the independent effect of the electoral system for 
legislative elections. MAGNITUDE is a measure of the average district 
magnitude in the lowest electoral tier in a country (Golder 2006: 37). It is 
calculated as the total number of seats allocated in an electoral tier divided by 
the total number of districts in that tier. We take the values from the data set 
described in Bormann and Golder (2013) and their tier1_avemag variable. 
Where there are missing observations we add a small number of values (3.8 
per cent of the total observations) from Johnson and Wallack (2012) and their 
m dist variable. Consistent with standard practice, we log the values for this 
variable. The second control variable (ENEG) captures the level of social 
divisions in a country. This is the effective number of ethnic groups. We take 
the values for ENEG from the replication data set that Golder (2007) makes 
available for his 2006 article. This variable is stationary within country units. 
Therefore, we can record a value for countries beyond the period included in 
Golder’s study. Golder calculated the ENEG figures from Fearon’s (2003) 
data. Therefore, where countries are missing from Golder’s data set, we 
calculate the ENEG value directly from Fearon’s data. These data are 
available at www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/ (accessed 1 July 2013). Thirdly, 
consistent with previous work, we include an interaction of 
MAGNITUDE*ENEG. 
 
Data and model specifications 
 
We test our theory on an original data set of countries and elections from 
1945-2011. The list of countries and the time periods during which we record 
elections is listed in Table 1. To be included, countries have to register a 
Polity2 score of ≥+6 for at least five consecutive years. This means that some 
countries are included when they reached this threshold even if their Polity2 
score subsequently fell below this level. We believe that it is reasonable to 
include these countries because there was at least a minimal period of 
democracy prior to the collapse during which we should be able to observe 
the effect of direct presidential elections on the legislative party system. This 
logic follows the practice of existing studies. In addition, consistent with 
Golder’s (2006) original study we exclude countries such as Guyana where 
the president and the legislature are elected on a single ballot. Again 
consistent with Golder, we also exclude Colombia prior to 1974 because of the 
pact that agreed the outcome of the election in advance. When a country 
meets these criteria we include it when the constitution makes provision for 
either a directly or an indirectly elected president. That is to say, we exclude 
parliamentary monarchies from the data set. We have a total of 544 legislative 
elections in 82 countries. The number of elections per country ranges from 1 
to 32. 
 We use the models with the same constitutive explanatory variables as 
Golder (2006: 37) and Hicken and Stoll (2013: 301). However, the interaction 
terms and the case selection varies across the set of models. Model 1 replicates 
Golder’s (2006) model where the interaction term of interest is 
PROXIMITY*ENPC. This model includes parliamentary systems. Model 2 
replicates Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) model where the interaction term of 
interest is PRESPOW*PROXIMITY*ENPC. This model includes parliamentary 
systems and also includes three further constitutive interaction terms 
PROXIMITY*ENPC, PRESPOW*ENPC and PRESPOW*PROXIMITY. Model 3 
replicates Model 1 but excludes parliamentary systems. Model 4 replicates 
Model 2 but excludes parliamentary systems. Model 5 tests the model that we 
propose in this article. Here, the interaction term of interest is 
PRESPOW*ENPC. We include PROXIMITY as a control variable and we test 
the model solely on countries with a directly elected president. Overall, 
Models 1 and 2 are designed to determine whether or not we can replicate the 
original results of Golder’s (2006) and Hicken and Stoll’s (2013) models. If we 
can, then we can be confident that the case selection is not artificially driving 
the result. Models 3-5 test the competing hypotheses that were identified in 
the previous section. Model 3 tests Golder’s hypothesis but only in the context 
of countries with a directly elected president. Model 4 tests Hicken and Stoll’s 
hypothesis in the same context. Model 5 tests our hypothesis. We use 
ordinary least squares regression to estimate all the models and, consistent 
with Golder’s (2006) preferred estimation, we report country-clustered 
standard errors in parentheses for Models 1 and 3, while for Models 2, 4 and 
5, consistent with Hicken and Stoll’s (2013: 303) preferred estimation, we 
report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to both autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity, in parentheses. 
 
Results 
 
We report the results of the five models in Table 2. Model 1 tests Golder’s 
hypothesis with the inclusion of parliamentary systems. It is very difficult to 
interpret the regression table when there are interaction terms (Brambor et al 
2006). Therefore, like Golder (2006: 41, Figure 1e), Figure 1a portrays the key 
interaction effect graphically. Golder’s original model shows that proximate 
presidential and legislative elections have a reductive impact on the effective 
number of legislative parties when the effective number of presidential 
candidates is fewer than between three and four. The same model with our 
dataset shows the same result when the effective number of presidential 
candidates is fewer than about three. Therefore, we are capturing his key 
finding. Our model also shows a significant inflationary impact on the 
effective number of legislative parties when the effective number of 
presidential candidates is greater than about five, whereas Golder does not 
show this result. However, his graph ends when this figure is seven and the 
trend for the effective number of legislative parties is upwards. Generally, 
therefore, we can be confident that our dataset is generating basically the 
same result as Golder’s original model. 
Model 2 tests Hicken and Stoll’s hypothesis with the inclusion of 
parliamentary systems. Figure 1b shows Hicken and Stoll’s key interaction 
effect. In their article, Hicken and Stoll (2013: 307) present figures that show 
the interaction of the proximity of presidential and legislative elections and 
the effective number of presidential candidates at four values of presidential 
power. Given space limitations, we report the results for just one value. 
Figure 1b shows their original result when the president is relatively strong. 
On their scale this is the result for countries with a presidential power score of 
14 on a scale with values from 1-22. On our scale, this is the result with a 
presidential power score of 0.5 on a scale with values from 0-0.7. Both results 
show that when there is a relatively strong president proximate presidential 
and legislative elections have a reductive impact on the legislative party 
system when the effective number of presidential candidates is about three or 
fewer. Like Hicken and Stoll, Figure 1b also shows that when there is a large 
effective number of presidential candidates, there is a significant inflationary 
impact on the effective number of legislative parties. The results are very 
similar to Hicken and Stoll’s at the other three equivalent values of 
presidential power too. Overall, we can be confident that our dataset is 
generating very similar results to those reported in the original articles by 
Golder and Hicken and Stoll. 
 Model 3 tests Golder’s hypothesis excluding parliamentary systems. 
Figure 2a graphs the key interaction effect. We see very clearly that the 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections has no significant effect on 
the legislative party system at any value for the effective number of 
presidential candidates. Model 4 tests Hicken and Stoll’s hypothesis 
excluding parliamentary systems. Figure 2b graphs the key interaction effect. 
Again, we report the result with a presidential power value of 0.5. Like the 
result for Golder, we find that at this value of presidential power the 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections has no effect on the 
legislative party system whatever the value of the effective number of 
presidential candidates. We do not report them, but the same result is 
returned at the three other equivalent vales of presidential power to the ones 
presented in Hicken and Stoll’s article. So, we find that when we exclude 
parliamentary systems there is no longer any support for either Golder’s or 
Hicken and Stoll’s hypotheses. 
 Model 5 tests our hypothesis solely on countries with directly elected 
presidents. Figure 3 graphs the key interaction effect. As expected, we find 
that presidential power has a reductive effect on the legislative party system 
in an intermediate range of values for the effective number of presidential 
candidates. Specifically, we find a significant result for such a reduction in a 
range between 1 and 3 candidates. This range covers 62 per cent of the total 
observations in our dataset. In terms of the control variables, the interaction 
effect between the effective number of ethnic groups and the natural log of 
average district magnitude returns the expected result. The effective number 
of ethnic groups has a significant and positive effect on the legislative party 
system at values for the natural log of average district magnitude that are 
greater than about 0.5, namely outside pure first-past-the-post systems. 
To confirm the robustness of our result, we re-estimated Model 5 using 
Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-corrected-standard-errors (PCSE) model. Hicken 
and Stoll (2013: 315) reject this estimation technique on the grounds that there 
is little theoretical reason to expect cross-country contemporaneous 
correlation in such models and that it is difficult to obtain a good estimate of 
this correlation when there are few common time periods across countries. 
However, we know that there are demonstration effects at elections across 
countries. For example, recent Latin American elections have increasingly 
manifested similar types of presidential candidates, ranging from more left-
wing populist often indigenous candidates to more neo-liberal, pro-business 
candidates often backed by international investors. So, it is reasonable to use a 
PCSE model at least as a robustness test. We do not report the results here, 
but we find that they are very similar to the ones shown in Model 5. Also, 
given we find no support for the deflationary effect of proximate presidential 
and legislative elections, we re-estimate the model excluding the PROXIMITY 
variable. Again, the results, not reported, are similar to Model 5. Here, 
though, there is a significant reductive effect for all values below around two 
effective presidential candidates. Overall, therefore, we find good support for 
our hypothesis and we have good reason to believe that the findings are 
robust. 
 
Discussion 
 
These results raise a number of issues. Firstly, they show that in countries 
with direct presidential elections the proximity of presidential elections to 
legislative elections has neither an independent effect on the legislative party 
system nor an effect that depends upon another standard institutional 
variable. This finding flies in the face of well-known empirical examples, such 
as the French case since 2002. It also goes against the findings of Shugart 
(1995), who identified a separate independent effect of proximate elections, as 
well as Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), Golder (2006) and Hicken and Stoll 
(2013), who all found a significant effect for proximity when interacted with 
other variables. We stress that our findings are probabilistic. We do not claim 
that there is no promixity effect anywhere. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable 
to think that there is a proximity effect in France, whereas generally this is not 
the case. More substantively, though, we are struck by how the debate about 
the effect of proximate elections has developed over time. Shugart and Carey 
(1992) first discussed the notion of an independent effect of proximity, but did 
not submit it to rigorous testing. Shugart (1995) did test its independent effect, 
but on only a relatively small number of countries. Amorim Neto and Cox 
(1997) and Golder (2006) then tested its effect in interaction with the effective 
number of presidential candidates. Hicken and Stoll (2013) added a further 
interaction with presidential powers. One way of thinking about this debate is 
to say that researchers have been downgrading the independent effect of 
proximity over the course of time. Put another way, while the idea that 
presidential elections have an impact on the legislative party system is highly 
intuitive, work has increasingly suggested that this intuition needs to be 
refined. In this context, our findings merely take such a story to its logical 
conclusion. What is more, we have stressed that since Amorim Neto and Cox 
(1997) studies of proximity have included countries with indirectly elected 
presidents and monarchs in their estimations. Indeed, we have noted that 
parliamentary countries comprise a majority of the observations in recent 
studies. Yet, by definition, there can be no coattails effect in these countries. 
For that reason, the coding of the proximity variable in them is hypothetical. 
The value recorded is the same as the one for elections at the exact mid-term 
in a country with a direct presidential election. This strategy is the best 
available option if parliamentary republics and monarchies are to be 
included. However, why include them when we have no expectations about 
the effect of the key variables under consideration in these regimes, when 
including them requires recording a hypothetical value, and when there is 
already variation in the key set of explanatory variables under investigation 
within the set of countries with direct presidential elections alone? Overall, 
while there has been a long-standing expectation about the effect of proximate 
presidential and legislative elections on the legislative party system, we find 
no evidence of this effect and we suggest that this finding is not as unusual as 
it might at first appear, given the way in which the debate has developed over 
time and given recent research strategies. 
 Secondly, we have stressed the importance of presidential power in 
shaping the legislative party system when interacted with the effective 
number of presidential candidates. We need to think carefully about how the 
presidential power variable is operationalized. There is a concern that current 
measures of presidential power are unreliable (Fortin 2013). There is also a 
worry that results are sensitive to the use of the particular presidential power 
variable that is employed (Tavits 2009). We had to decide whether to develop 
a new measure of presidential power and test for its effect or to work with 
one or more existing measures of presidential power. We preferred the latter 
strategy. We had no reason to believe that a specially constructed measure for 
the purposes of this article would be any more reliable than existing 
measures. We also expected that the results derived from any such measure 
would be sensitive to the application of alternative measures. Indeed, when 
we re-estimated Model 5 replacing our measure of presidential power with 
Siaroff’s (2003) measure, we found that the results were indeed different, even 
though there is a strong correlation (0.92) between our measure of 
presidential power and Siaroff’s measure. Using Siaroff’s measure, we found 
that presidential power had a significant effect only at a very low effective 
number of presidential candidates (<2) and that the effect was very weak (p = 
0.091). These points reinforce the conclusion that researchers should think 
very carefully about how they operationalize the concept of presidential 
power. For example, even though Hicken and Stoll (2013) report that their 
results are robust to different formulations of their preferred measure of 
presidential power, we wonder whether they are robust to different and, 
arguably, equally valid measures. In this context, when capturing variation in 
presidential power we preferred to pool ten existing measures rather than 
rely on one measure. We believe that this strategy minimizes the 
idiosyncrasies of individual country codings and, indeed, the idiosyncrasies 
of individual measures, generating a more genuinely robust finding. We 
argue that this way of capturing presidential power should be applied more 
generally and that researchers should refrain from reporting results based on 
only one measure of presidential power. 
 Thirdly, we followed Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and stressed the 
importance of the effective number of presidential candidates on the 
legislative party system when interacted with presidential power. In some 
form or another, all recent work on presidential coattails has underlined the 
importance of the effective number of presidential candidates. For this reason 
alone, we need to explore its determinants in more detail. Jones (1999) has 
shown that the electoral system used for presidential elections helps to 
determine the number of presidential candidates. All else equal, he finds that 
run-off systems generate one more effective candidate than plurality systems 
(ibid.: 182). Golder (2006: 44) has shown that social heterogeneity further 
increases the effective number of candidates under run-off systems. In this 
article, we follow Hicken and Stoll (2008) and argue that the size of the 
presidential prize will also shape the effective number of presidential 
candidates. However, as argued in the Theory section, we think somewhat 
differently about how it will do so. Specifically, rather than a bell-shaped 
curve or a sideways, elongated S, we think that parties will face a specific 
incentive to coordinate their electoral strategies only within an intermediate 
range of presidential power. Outside that range, the effect of presidential 
power is indeterminate. Yet, are there other determinants of the effective 
number of candidates? For example, we know that the electoral system for 
presidential elections shapes the number of candidates, but what about other 
rules? Does it make a difference whether or not candidates can be proposed 
solely by political parties represented in the legislature, or whether the 
nomination process is open to citizens more generally? If citizens can 
nominate candidates, does it make a difference how many signatures are 
required? Rules of this sort may also shape the effective number of 
presidential candidates and may help us to disentangle the effects of 
presidential power on the number of candidates and, by extension, on the 
legislative party system. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article builds on the existing literature about the effect of presidential 
coattails on the legislative party system. The idea that the legislative party 
system is shaped by the coattails of directly elected presidents is highly 
intuitive. The first studies that tested for the direct effect of this factor found 
some empirical support for the idea. However, recently, the effect of 
presidential coattails has been shown to be contingent upon other factors, 
namely the effective number of presidential candidates and presidential 
power. This article proposes that we think about the determinants of the 
legislative party system somewhat differently. Controlling for standard 
electoral system and social heterogeneity variables, we argue that the 
legislative party system is shaped by the effective number of presidential 
candidates but only within an intermediary range of presidential power. This 
is because presidential power itself helps to determine the effective number of 
presidential candidates by encouraging parties to behave strategically but 
only in a way that we can clearly observe within such an intermediary range. 
We also stress that we should think differently about how we test for the 
effect of this interaction. Typically, scholars have done so by pooling 
presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary countries, even though the 
effect of the variable under investigation only applies to countries with direct 
presidential elections. We are skeptical that parliamentary countries can be 
included on the basis that they constitute a natural experiment. Instead, we 
suggest that the effects under consideration should be tested solely in 
countries with directly elected presidents. Having replicated existing studies, 
we find good evidence for our propositions. Our results cast doubt on the 
highly intuitive idea that presidential coattails shape the legislative party 
system. However, they reinforce the idea that the effective number of 
presidential candidates is an important determinant of the legislative party 
system, suggesting that we need to reassess the determinants of this factor. 
Presidential power is one of them. We argue that we need to think carefully 
about how we capture presidential power and stress that relying on a single 
measure is likely to be problematic. Instead, we encourage scholars generally 
to pool a multitude of measures so as to try to capture this important variable 
as reliably as possible. 
  
Table 1 List of countries, time periods, and presidential power scores 
 
Country 
Period legislative 
elections are included 
(inclusive) 
Mean normalized 
presidential power 
score 
Albania 2005- 0.18 
Argentina 1983-1994 0.56 
Argentina 1995- 0.55 
Austria 1949- 0.12 
Bangladesh 1991-2001 0.18 
Benin 1991- 0.57 
Botswana 1969- 0.61 
Brazil 1986- 0.55 
Bulgaria 1994- 0.25 
Cape Verde 1991- 0.35 
Chile 1965-1969 0.58 
Chile 1993- 0.61 
Colombia 1974-1991 0.64 
Colombia 1994- 0.43 
Costa Rica 1953- 0.44 
Croatia 2000 0.39 
Croatia 2003- 0.33 
Cyprus 1985- 0.50 
Czech Republic 1992- 0.18 
Dominican Republic 1998- 0.53 
Ecuador 1979-1998 0.52 
Ecuador 2002 0.68 
El Salvador 1985-2000 0.42 
El Salvador 2003- 0.67 
Estonia 1992- 0.18 
Finland 1948-1954 0.56 
Finland 1958-1999 0.43 
Finland 2003- 0.16 
France 1946-1956 0.22 
France 1973- 0.45 
Georgia 2004- 0.56 
Germany 1949- 0 
Ghana 2004- 0.62 
Greece 1977-1985 0.33 
Greece 1989- 0 
Guatemala 1999- 0.43 
Guinea-Bissau 2008 0.43 
Honduras 1997- 0.49 
Hungary 1990- 0.18 
India 1951- 0.16 
Indonesia 1999- 0.07 
Ireland 1948- 0.17 
Israel 1949- 0.08 
Italy 1948- 0.22 
Kenya 2002- 0.64 
Rep. of Korea 1988- 0.52 
Latvia 1993- 0.12 
Liberia 2011  
Lithuania 1992- 0.32 
Macedonia 1994- 0.26 
Madagascar 1993-1998 0.35 
Madagascar 2002-2007 0.66 
Malawi 1994- 0.56 
Mali 1992-2007 0.47 
Mauritius 1995- 0.22 
Mexico 1997- 0.60 
Moldova 1994-1998 0.37 
Moldova 2001- 0.22 
Mongolia 1992- 0.35 
Myanmar 1951-1960  
Nicaragua 1990- 0.52 
Nigeria 1964 0.11 
Pakistan 1988-1997 0.56 
Panama 1989- 0.53 
Paraguay 1993- 0.52 
Peru 1980-1990 0.50 
Peru 2001- 0.40 
Philippines 1987- 0.46 
Poland 1991-1997 0.35 
Poland 2001- 0.29 
Portugal 1976-1980 0.50 
Portugal 1983- 0.26 
Romania 1996- 0.31 
South Africa 1994- 0.75 
Senegal 2001- 0.69 
Sierra Leone 2007 0.49 
Slovakia 1994-1998 0.16 
Slovakia 2002- 0.14 
Slovenia 1992- 0.14 
Somalia 1964  
Sri Lanka 1977  
Taiwan 1995- 0.42 
Trinidad and Tobago 1976- 0.11 
Turkey 1961-1969 0.22 
Turkey 1973-1977 0.22 
Turkey 1983- 0.38 
Ukraine 1994 0.43 
Ukraine 1998-2006 0.46 
Ukraine 2007 0.15 
USA 1946- 0.55 
Venezuela 1963-2000 0.44 
 
Note: This is the full list of countries that enter one or more of Models 1-5. 
Countries that meet the selection criterion for democracy, but for which there 
are incomplete values for other variables are not recorded e.g. Timor-Leste 
2007. Countries without a value for presidential power but with full values 
for all other variables can still be included in Models 1 and 3. 
 
Table 2 Estimating the effective number of electoral parties 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
PROXIMITY -3.60 
(0.65)*** 
-3.81 
(2.02)* 
-0.47 
(0.83) 
0.64 
(2.96) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
ENPC 
0.11 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
0.90 
(0.24)*** 
0.68 
(0.63) 
0.57 
(0.41) 
PROXIMITY 
*ENPC 
1.12 
(0.27)*** 
1.29 
(0.83) 
0.15 
(0.28) 
-0.19 
(1.05)  
PRESPOW  
-2.87 
(0.71)***  
-3.34 
(3.60) 
-3.95 
(2.44) 
PRESPOW* 
PROXIMITY  
2.63 
(4.29)  
-1.12 
(6.03)  
PRESPOW* 
ENPC  
0.92 
(0.54)*  
0.70 
(1.37) 
0.89 
(0.90) 
PRESPOW* 
PROXIMITY* 
ENPC 
 -1.03 
(1.78) 
 0.35 
(2.18) 
 
ENEG 
0.34 
(0.12)*** 
0.26 
(0.09)*** 
0.26 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
MAGNITUDE 
0.62 
(0.19)*** 
0.51 
(0.17)*** 
0.05 
(0.42) 
-0.38 
(0.27) 
-0.38 
(0.26) 
MAGNITUDE* 
ENEG 
-0.13 
(0.06)** 
-0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.24 
(0.27) 
0.45 
(0.16)*** 
0.44 
(0.16)*** 
Constant 2.87 (0.49)*** 
3.61 
(0.31)*** 
0.40 
(0.92) 
2.08 
(1.70) 
2.41 
(1.14) 
N 452 443 292 291 291 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.40 0.40 
Root mean 
square error 1.79 1.78 1.73 1.69 1.68 
 
Country-
clustered 
standard 
Newey-
West 
standard 
Country-
clustered 
standard 
Newey-
West 
standard 
Newey-
West 
standard 
errors errors errors errors errors 
 
Figure 1a Replication of Golder’s model (Model 1) 
 
  
Golder’s model (2006: 41) original 
dataset 
Golder’s model our dataset 
  
 
Figure 1b Replication of Hicken and Stoll’s model (Model 2) 
 
 
 
Hicken and Stoll’s (2013: 307) model 
with a relatively strong president 
original dataset 
Hicken and Stoll’s model with a 
relatively strong president our 
dataset 
 
  
Figure 2a Replication of Golder’s model without parliamentary systems 
(Model 3) 
 
 
 
Figure 2b Replication of Hicken and Stoll’s model without 
parliamentary systems when there is a relatively strong 
president (Model 4) 
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Figure 3 The interaction of presidential power and the effective 
number of presidential candidates on the legislative party 
system (Model 5) 
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